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COMMENT
Judicial Review of Forest Service
Timber Sales: Environmental Plaintiffs Gain New Options Under the
Oregon Wilderness Act
The management of this country's forest resources engenders
significant debate. While growing numbers may desire to leave
timberlands untouched and pristine, others argue that significant valuable
resources will be "wasted" if timber is left standing. Whether the debate
centers on environmental concerns such as wildlife habitat or water
quality, on the basic economic needs of rural timber-based communities,
or on the aesthetic demands of recreationists, timber harvesting is an
issue which has been thrust into the national spotlight. Caught in the
middle is the National Forest Service as it tries to carry out its mandate
of managing the country's National Forests.
This comment looks to the ways Congress and courts have dealt
with competing environmental and economic equities which surround the
harvest of old growth timber. Rather than presenting a round-up of all
the pertinent cases, this comment focuses on a recent decision from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.' This particular
decision is chosen because it presents an interesting insight into issues
future litigants should consider. More particularly, the decision's real
importance lies in the fact that it creates opportunities for environmental
plaintiffs who would like to challenge Forest Service management
decisions but who were previously barred by restrictive language in
various wilderness statutes.
INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in National Audubon Society v. United States Forest
Service2 reversed a lower court injunction against four timber sales in the
Rogue River National Forest in Oregon. The court rejected the argument
of the Forest Service that the Oregon Wilderness Act3 (OWA) prevents

1. National Audubon Society v. U.S. Forest Service & Christie, 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993). Bill Christie, Jr. and Huffman & Wright Logging Co.
intervened on behalf of defendant Forest Service. See Order granting Forest Service Motion
in Limine, in Appellants' Joint Excerpts of Record, at 14 [hereinafter E.R.J.
3. Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272 (1984).
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a court from reviewing a government agency's decision not to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before offering timber sales. The
Ninth Circuit held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)4
requires the Forest Service to consider the environmental consequences
of timber harvesting on inventoried but roadless tracts of land.' By
relying on NEPA, the Ninth Circuit surmounted provisions in the OWA
which preclude judicial review of Forest Service decisions.
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that the OWA prohibits judicial
review of the EIS of the second "Roadless Area Review and Evaluation"
(RARE II).6 The Ninth Circuit also correctly found that, under the OWA,
a court may not review Forest Service decisions to categorize certain lands
as wilderness. The Ninth Circuit read beyond the provisions of the OWA,
however, to conclude that the OWA's prohibition of judicial review does
not apply to the roaded or roadless determinations of RARE II. This
comment argues, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, that the OWA's
judicial review provisions apply to the entire inventory conducted under
RARE II, that is, to wilderness-nonwilderness designations as well as
roaded-roadless determinations. The Ninth Circuit's bifurcation of RARE
I's inventory process has led to its confusion toward the OWA's judicial
review provisions and gives this decision important long-term implications
by allowing environmental plaintiffs greater ability to circumvent the
OWA's prohibitions on judicial review.7
This comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit's threshold determination that a court could review the decision made by the Forest Service to
offer four timber sales in the Rogue River National Forest. After a brief
presentation of the history of the case, this comment provides a discussion of background law vital to an understanding of the Ninth Circuit's
approach. An analysis of the Ninth Circuit's handling of the issue of
judicial review under the OWA and the Northwest Timber Compromise
4. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321-

70(b)(1988)).
5. 4 F.3d at 837.
6. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
7. Indeed, a recent decision from the Ninth Circuit, Smith v. U.S. Forest Service, 33 F.3d
1072 (1994), has expanded on National Audubon Society to overrule a lower court's failure to
grant an injunction against timber harvesting in Washington State. In Smith, a recreational
user of Forest Service lands successfully challenged Forest Service management decisions
on the basis of the land's roadless character.
8.The four sales at issue in National Audubon Society were offered during Fiscal Year 1990
pursuant to the terms of the "Northwest Timber Compromise." Codified in section 318 of
the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1989 (FY 1990),
Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989), the Compromise established rules governing
timber harvesting and contained provisions limiting judicial review of individual timber
sales. For a discussion of the Northwest Timber Compromise, see infra notes 66-77 and
accompanying text.
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follows. Finally, a brief conclusion discusses potential implications of the
decision.
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY IN REVIEW
In fiscal year 1990, pursuant to the Northwest Timber Compromise9, the Forest Service offered for sale the Ace, Butch, Varmit, and
Head timber sales. These tracts of land are located in primarily unroaded
and undeveloped areas of Region 6 of the Rogue River National Forest
in Oregon; each tract would require some road building and reconstruction prior to timber harvesting."0 The four sales contain valuable old
growth timber which provides habitat for the northern spotted owl. 1
The Ace timber sale was formerly encompassed within the Bitter Lick
Roadless Area 2, the Butch and Varmit timber sales lie along the western
boundary of Crater Lake National Park, and the Head timber sale borders
the Sky Lakes Wilderness Area.13
Plaintiffs in the lower court' 4 claimed that each timber sale
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In their
complaint, plaintiffs averred for each sale that the defendant Forest
Service failed to (1) "adequately describe the affected environment of the
sale area"; (2) "examine the environmental consequences of the proposed
action"; (3) "consider the benefits to solitude, recreation, wildlife and
other resources of leaving [the areas] in an unroaded and undeveloped
condition"; and (4) "analyze the feasibility of managing this area in
conjunction with" the adjacent Wilderness Areas and National Park. 5
Plaintiffs claimed that, because of the roadless character of the land, and
pursuant to NEPA, the Forest Service was obliged to prepare an EIS on
each sale, and not just individual environmental assessments (EA)."6

9. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
10. See Excerpts of Ace, Butch, Head, and Varmit Environmental Assessments, in E.R.,
supra note 2, at 16-63.
11. Id.
12. § 3(9) of the Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984 released the Bitter Lick Roadless Area
when it established the "Rogue-Umpqua Divide Wilderness". Pub. L.No. 98-328, 98 Stat.
at 273. See Excerpts from Environmental Assessment for the Ace Timber Sale, in E.R., supra
note 2, at 20.
13. The Sky Lakes Wilderness Area was established pursuant to the OWA, Pub. L.No.
98-328, § 3(15), 98 Stat. at 274.
14. National Audubon Society, Oregon Natural Resources Council, Lane County Audubon
Society, Friends of Greensprings, Sky Lakes Wilderness Committee, Headwaters, and Soda
Mountain Wilderness Council. See Amended Complaint, in E.R., supra note 2, at 2-5.
15. See Amended Complaint, in E.R., supra note 2, at 9.
16. To satisfy NEPA's procedural requirements, agencies must prepare EAs on proposed
activities unless the action falls within an exclusion. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)(2), 1501.4(b),
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Defendants U.S. Forest Service and Christie asserted in district
court that no EIS is required for the sales because plaintiffs' challenge is
barred by the OWA. n Defendants claimed that by passing the OWA,
Congress settled "once and for all time, what areas the Forest Service
shall evaluate as roadless areas" (emphasis in original), and barred "all
judicial review that could reach a contrary result."18
The Forest Service filed a motion in limine to restrict the district
court's review to the administrative record. The lower court granted the
motion, but told the parties that it would "receive affidavits on what the
record actually included."" The district court then reviewed what it had
received of the administrative record under a "reasonableness" standard' ° and concluded that the failure of the Forest Service to prepare an
EIS was "unreasonable".2 Rejecting the Forest Service's argument that
plaintiffs' challenge was barred by the Oregon Wilderness Act, the district
court enjoined the four timber sales until the Forest Service completed an
EIS on each sale.22 The Forest Service and Christie appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit.
BACKGROUND LAW
A. Wilderness Act of 1964, RARE I & II
In 1964, Congress passed the Wilderness Ace' "to secure for the
American people of present and future generations the benefits of an
enduring resource of wilderness." The Act established the National
Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federal lands
designated as "wilderness."' Within ten years after its promulgation,

1508.9 (1990). The agency must then decide whether to prepare an EIS based on
determinations made in the EA. §§ 1501.4(c), 1508.11.
17. E.R., supra note 2, at 148.
18. Id.
19. See Hearing Transcript Excerpts, in E.R., supra note 2, at 81. The issue of whether the
district court correctly allowed affidavits on what the administrative record included is
beyond the scope of this comment. A district court has subsequently followed National
Audubon Society for the proposition that a "court's review is generally limited to the
pertinent administrative record, and any affidavits proffered by defendants which provide
background or explain the record." See Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National
Marine Fisheries, 850 F.Supp 886, 894 (D.Or. 1994).
20. See Amended Opinion, in E.R., supra note 2, at 142-57.
21. Id. at 152.
22. Id. at 153.
23. Pub. L.No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 US.C. §§ 1131-36).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
25. Id. The Act defines "wilderness" as "an area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining
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the Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to review areas designated
"primitive" by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest
Service as to their suitability for wilderness classification; the Secretary
then had to report his findings to the President of the United States.'
The Secretary of the Interior, in turn, was directed to review all roadless
areas of five thousand acres or more for possible future preservation as
wilderness. The Act then authorized the President to make recommendations to Congress to include specific areas within the wilderness
preservation system."'
As a means of carrying out the Wilderness Act's directives, the
Forest Service undertook in 1972 the first Roadless Area Review and
Evaluation (RARE 1) "to identify those roadless and undeveloped areas
which were the best candidates for inclusion in the Wilderness System."'" RARE I considered 56 million acres throughout the United
States, and resulted in the selection in October 1973 of 274 roadless and
undeveloped areas comprising approximately 12.3 million acres for study
as possible wilderness.-' This nationwide review of "roadless areas"
came to a premature ending, however, when a federal court enjoined
development of lands pursuant to RARE I pending completion of an EIS
and compliance with NEPA.
In response to its first failed effort, the Forest Service in June 1977
made a second attempt at the national evaluation of National Forest
lands. The purpose of RARE II was to speed the process of wilderness
allocation and to open remaining roadless areas to development."

its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the
imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres
of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value." 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
28. Id.
29. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (1977).
30. Id. See generally State of California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465,471 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
31. RARE I considered lands throughout the country, but was "designed essentially to
deal with the West." See 42 Fed. Reg. at 59,688.
32, Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
33. State of California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. at 471. RARE 11 defined a "roadless area"
as "an area exclusive of improved roads constructed or maintained for travel by means of
motorized vehicles intended for highway use." See U.S. Forest Service, RARE II Final
Environmental Statement, Pub. No. A 13.92:R 53/2 6 [hereinafter RARE II Final Environmental Statement].
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RARE II allocated each roadless area to specific planning categories:
"wilderness", "further planning", or "non-wilderness".' RARE II
designated 15 million acres of roadless lands to "wilderness", 10.8 million
acres to "further planning", and 36 million acres to "non-wilderness"
classification.35 The Forest Service issued the RARE II Final EIS in
January 1979.1
In July 1979, the State of California challenged in federal district
court the Forest Service's decision to designate 47 areas comprising nearly
one million acres of land in California as non-wilderness.3 7 The State
charged that the designations violated NEPA, the Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) , and the National Forest Management Act
of 1976 (NFMA).
In California v. Block 3 , the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court to hold that, even though the RARE 1I Final EIS
contained an adequate discussion of site-specific environmental consequences of the nonwilderness allocations, it did not contain an adequate
range of alternatives. 4' The Ninth Circuit also held that the NFMA did
not preclude judicial review of non-wilderness allocations under
NEPA. 2
The decision in Californiav. Block dealt a major blow to the Forest
Service wilderness review program because it potentially applied NEPA
to the development of RARE II released lands. Though Californiav. Block
technically covered only roadless areas recommended for non-wilderness
in California, the repercussions were potentially broad enough to
question the Forest Service's management decisions throughout the Ninth
Circuit, regardless of whether they dealt with wilderness, nonwilderness,
roadless or roaded designations.

34. On lands designated as "wilderness" the Forest Service could not undertake any
activities which would affect the natural condition. "Non-wilderness" lands would be
available for a variety of uses, including management for timber, extraction of minerals,
developed and motorized recreation, and any other activities allowed on non-wilderness
National Forest lands consistent with existing plans and the National Forest Management
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. f§ 1600-14)
(NFMA). Lands designated as "further planning" were to be protected until the completion
of a "unit management plan" which decided whether to include these lands into the
Wilderness System. See State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 758 (1982).
35. RARE II Final Environmental Statement, supra note 33, at 96. See 44 Fed. Reg. 3087
(1979).
36. Id.
37. State of California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 472.
38. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 52-31).
39. Pub. L. No. 94-588,90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §9 1600-14). See State of
California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
40. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 775.
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In the wake of the Ninth Circuit ruling in California v. Blocks,
Congress passed a series of wilderness acts. In each of these acts,
Congress inserted "release-sufficiency" language which precludes
judicial review with respect to RARE II designations of wilderness."
Congress was sensitive to the fact that RARE II could be brought to a
standstill, and that a "RARE III" would be necessary. 45 To justify
including the judicial review language in the wilderness acts passed for
individual states, Congress may also have been aware that the Forest
Service spends much of its time and money in court defending its
decisions and not carrying out its mandate to manage the national
forests.46 Although there is ambiguity in the scope of these judicial
review provisions, the congressional objective was to facilitate the federal
management of the federal lands.
B. The Oregon Wilderness Act
Congress passed the OWA 47 to "designate certain National
Forest System lands and certain public lands in the State of Oregon as
components of the National Wilderness Preservation System, in order to
promote, perpetuate, and preserve the wilderness character of the lands
.... ] " The OWA designated approximately 859,600 acres as "compo-

43. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-406, § 103,98 Stat. 1485, 148990; California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, § 111, 98 Stat. 1619, 1628; Nevada
Wilderness Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-195, § 5, 103 Stat. 1784, 1786; Oregon Wilderness
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, § 7, 98 Stat. 272, 278; Utah Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-428, § 201, 98 Stat. 1657, 1659; Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L No.
98-339, § 5,98 Stat. 299,302-03; Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-550, § 401,
98 Stat. 2807, 2811.
Other states with wilderness acts which include the same predusionary language
include: Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin.
45. See SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES ON OREGON WILDERNESS ACT

OF 1984, S. REP. No. 465, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Senate Report on OWAI.
46. Indeed, the Forest Service recently reported that it was spending $150 million a year
dealing with administrative appeals, while its budget for fiscal year 1993 totalled $118
million for wildlife and fish habitat and $226 million for timber sales administration. See
Forest Service Appeals Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources: Effect the Appeal of Forest Plans and Timber
Supply Sales May Have on Timber Supply and the Forest Service's Ability to Meet its Mandate of
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1991) (testimony of Dale
Robertson, Chief, U.S. Forest Service).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272 (1984).
48. § 2(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 272.
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' , but also
nents of the National Wilderness Preservation System"49

insured that "certain other National Forest System lands in the State of

Oregon be available for nonwilderness multiple use."'
Congress
passed the OWA in "furtherance of the purpose of the Wilderness Act"
of 1964 s' and "to resolve the RARE II issue in Oregon."' 2
Section 7 of the OWA includes the "release-sufficiency" language
at issue in National Audubon Society. Section 7 states that "[o~n the basis
of [RARE 111, the Congress hereby determines and directs that-(1)
without passing on the question of the legal and factual sufficiency of the
RARE II final environmental statement [... I such statement shall not be
subject to judicial review [ .

. I"' The section continues: "(2) with

respect to the National Forest System lands [... review and evaluation
or reference shall be deemed for the purpose of the initial land management plans required for such lands [... I to be an adequate consideration

of the suitability of such lands for inclusion in the National Wilderness
Preservation System [ ....I"' Furthermore, section 7 states: "(3) areas

in the State of Oregon reviewed in such final environmental statement
[. ..

and not designated as wilderness [. .

shall be managed for

multiple use [...
]: Provided, That such areas need not be managed for
the purpose of protecting their suitability for wilderness designation prior
to or during revision of the land management plans [ .

. ]F"'5The

OWA's judicial review provisions are limited to Forest Service System
roadless areas which are less then 5000 acres.'
Congress included "release" language in the OWA with the
purpose of "making lands available for nonwilderness management and
possible development."57 The controversy over whether or not to
include such language focused on the point at which lands not designated as wilderness or wilderness study but reviewed in the RARE II
process can again be considered for possible recommendation to Congress
for designation as wilderness.' The original bill troubled the timber
industry which claimed that the "release" language was "woefully
inadequate""' and would result in an "eminent shortage of timber

49. § 3, 98 Stat. at 272.
50. § 2(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 272.
51. § 3, 98 Stat. at 272.
52. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 6.
53. § 7(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 278.
54. § 7(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 278.
55. § 7(b)(3), 98 Stat. at 278.
56. § 7(d)(2), 98 Stat. at 278.
57. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 26.
58. Id.
59. The Oregon Wilderness Act: Hearingson H.R. 1149 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands
and Reserved Water of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
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resulting from the RARE II process f. ..J".60 With California v. Block6'
recently decided, Congress responded by attempting to ensure that the
Forest Service could not be forced by any individual or group through a
"lawsuit, administrative appeal, or otherwise" to manage federal lands not
designated as wilderness in a de facto wilderness manner.'
Similarly, Congress inserted the "sufficiency" language found in
section 7(b)(2)' of the OWA to counter the potentially sweeping effects
of California v. Block. The Senate Committee working on the OWA
reviewed the roadless areas in Oregon and concluded that the final RARE
II EIS is not subject to judicial review with respect to national forest
system lands in Oregon." The Committee was clear in deciding that the
sufficiency language held the RARE II EIS to be legally sufficient for the
roadless areas in the State of Oregon; thus, the Forest Service could
conduct a timber sale in a roadless area and not be challenged on the
ground that the land could, in the future, be classified as wilderness.'
The Committee left room for interpretation of whether the initial
decisions by the Forest Service as to roadless or roaded determinations
would also be immune from judicial scrutiny.
C.

The Northwest Timber Compromise

The controversy over timber cutting in the Northwest continued
unabated throughout the 1980s. In April, 1989, the Fish and Wildlife
Service recommended listing the northern spotted owl as a threatened
species. 6 After the announcement, Senators Hatfield (R-Or) and Adams
(D-Wa) responded by successfully passing the "Northwest Timber
Compromise" in the form of a "rider" on the Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1990.67 The
Northwest Timber Compromise, as section 318 of the Act, attempted to
reflect the competing concerns of both environmental and industry
groups. Section 318 established substantive and procedural requirements
and restrictions on timber harvesting, attempted to minimize fragmenta-

214-15 (1983) (Statement of Edward Pearson, Senior Resource Manager, Louisiana-Pacific
Corp.).
60. Id. at 213-14 (Statement of John Sheik, Managing Partner, Ochoco Lumber Co.).
61. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
62. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 30.
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 27.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Fish and Wildlife Service, Proposed Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl,
54 Fed. Reg. 26,666 (1989).
67. Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
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tion of remaining blocks of old growth forest, and included limits on
judicial review, while at the same time "releasing" from litigation 1.1
billion board feet of timber to be cut in fiscal year 1 9 9 0 .' Section 318
expired automatically on September 30,1990, though timber sales offered
pursuant to section 318 remained under its terms for the duration of the
sales contracts.' The four sales at issue in National Audubon Society were
offered under the terms of the Northwest Timber Compromise.
President Bush signed section 318 into law in October, 1989. As
of May of that year, eighty-five timber sales were under appeal in Region
6 of the United States Forest Service; as of February, 1990, Region 6
boasted at least 148 timber sales then being challenged in court.7"
Though one of the initial goals of the Hatfield-Adams amendment was
to preclude judicial review of agency actions, the final version failed to
contain the provision which expressly prohibited judicial review."
Nevertheless, the final version did include language which limited review
of certain provisions of the act.'
Between October, 1987, and October, 1989, when the bill was
signed into law, environmental groups had managed to successfully stop
all timber sale activity on federal land. 3 The principal cases were Seattle
Audubon Society v. Robertson74, and Portland Audubon Society v. Lujan.75
These two cases created severe restrictions on both the BLM and the
Forest Service's ability to proceed with scheduled and approved timber
sales.76 Section 318 explicitly addressed and dismissed both cases by
stating that "management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5) [...] is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the

68. Id.
69. § 318(k), 103 Stat. at 750.
70. See Bryan M. Johnston and Paul J.Krupin, The 1989 Pacific Northwest Timber Compromise: An Environmental Dispute Resolution Case Study of a Successful Battle that May Have Lost
the War, 27 WILLAMETTE L.REv. 613, 639-40 (1991).
71. H.R. REP. No. 101-264,101st. Cong., 1st Sess., 81, 85-86 (Oct. 2,1989). The preclusionary language that failed to pass provides: "(i) No restraining order, injunction, or void of
sale shall be issued by any court [...] with respect to any decision to prepare, advertise, offer,
and award timber sales from the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and
public lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls." See H.R. 2788,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 58,762-76 (daily ed. July 26, 1989).
72. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
73. Johnston and Krupin, supra note 70, at 622.
74. 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
75. Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,210 (D.Or. 1988), remanded,
866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), on remand, Portland Audubon Society v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456
(D.Or. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 911 (1990).
76. See Johnston and Krupin, supra note 70, at 622.
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statutory requirements that are the basis of the consolidated cases
[.. . .],,77
The Northwest Timber Compromise, like the Oregon Wilderness
Act before it, attempted to limit lawsuits against the BLM and Forest
Service. With the economic importance of timber harvesting in the
Pacific Northwest looming over the Congressional hearings, legislators
were concerned that neither the Forest Service nor the BLM would be
able to proceed with its mandate to manage the federal lands. Despite
laws like the Northwest Timber Compromise and section 7 of the OWA,
environmental groups have nevertheless continued to successfully be
heard in court. National Audubon Society v. United States Forest Service &
Christie directly addresses the preclusionary language found in both the
Northwest Timber Compromise and the OWA; it represents a recent
example of the Ninth Circuit's approach to balancing the harvest of old
growth timber with the protection of the threatened northern spotted owl.
ANALYSIS
The Forest Service and Christie argued to the Ninth Circuit that
the Congress, through the OWA and the Northwest Timber Compromise,
precluded judicial review of Forest Service land management decisions.
In opposition were the National Audubon Society et al.' who argued
that the Forest Service failed to comply with the requirements of NEPA
prior to selling the timber. The comment will discuss the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the judicial review provisions of the OWA and the Northwest
Timber Compromise.
A.

The OWA and JudicialReview

A central issue in National Audubon Society hinged on whether
the OWA precludes judicial review of Forest Service decisions to classify
lands as "roadless" or "roaded." The environmental groups argued that
each of the four sale areas contained undisturbed roadless areas and
therefore should only be offered for timber harvesting after the preparation of an EIS." The Forest Service, by contrast, argued that Congress
precluded review of roadless area determinations for the duration of the
8
"first generation" forest plans. D
77.
78.
79.
80.

§ 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
See supra note 14.
See Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants National Audubon Society et al. at 24-27.
See Opening Brief of Appellant United States Forest Service at 22-30. "First genera-
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The district court accepted the environmentalists' argument and
enjoined the Forest Service from offering the timber sales."' The Ninth
Circuit, however, held that the OWA's prohibition of judicial review
applies not to roadless or roaded determinations but only to wilderness
or nonwilderness designations8 2 and reversed the district court's
injunction.
The Ninth Circuit referred to City of Tenakee Springs v. Block" in
which it had construed the judicial review language of the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)." The Ninth
Circuit held in that decision that, under ANILCA, a court could not
review RARE II wilderness or nonwilderness designations. After the
RARE II process, any subsequent Forest Service allocations of nonwilderness areas to further development categories, however, properly fell
within the scope of judicial review.' Since the judicial review language
of the ANILCA and the OWA is virtually identical", the Ninth Circuit
in National Audubon Society placed the burden on the Forest Service and
Christie to distinguish this previous case. The appellants failed to meet
this burden.
In National Audubon Society, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Forest Service decisions to include lands into the National Wilderness
Preservation System through the RARE II process were not reviewable by
a court of law. Indeed, the Senate Committee which oversaw the OWA
stated that it has "very carefully reviewed the roadless areas in Oregon",
and concluded that "the final [RARE II] environmental statement is not
subject to judicial review with respect to national forest system lands in
Oregon."87 By explicitly precluding the RARE II EIS from judicial
review, the Senate Committee hoped to avoid a "RARE III".88
For lands not designated by RARE II as wilderness, the Senate
Committee was equally explicit: "To eliminate any possible misunderstanding I... ] the bill provides that areas not designated as wilderness

tion" forest plans are initial plans for the national forests which are reviewed and revised
periodically to provide for a variety of uses, one of which is wilderness use. Forest Service
regulations provide that a forest plan "shall ordinarily be revised on a 10-year cycle or at
least every 15 years." 36 C.F.R. § 219 .10(g). Moreover, the environmental impact statement
of each forest plan must be prepared according to NEPA procedures. 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(a).
81. Amended Opinion, in E.IL, supra note 2, at 144.

82. National Audubon Society, 4 F.3d at 837.
83. 778 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

84. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101).
85. City of Tenakee Springs, 778 F.2d at 1405.
86. Compare OWA, Pub. L. No. 98-328, § 7(b)(2)-(3), 98 Stat. at 278 (1984) with ANILCA,
Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 708(b)(2)-(3), 94 Stat. at 2421 (1980).
87. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 27.
88. Id. at 31.
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need not be managed for the purpose of protecting their suitability for
further wilderness review [. . I'89 The Committee suggested that
wilderness-like lands which have been designated nonwilderness posed
no obstacle to their future development. Likewise, the Committee made
it clear that the Forest Service could sell timber in roadless areas, and
stated that the Forest Service "already has statutory authority to manage
roadless areas for multiple use, nonwilderness purposes."' Against
objections by the environmental plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit stated that,
according to the OWA, roadless areas "need not be managed for the
purpose of protecting their suitability for wilderness designation
[.. .91
NationalAudubon Society misreads the legislative history, however,
when it holds that the OWA allows judicial review of initial RARE II
decisions to classify lands as roadless or roaded. The Senate Report is
clearer in its treatment of wilderness and nonwilderness areas than it is
in its treatment of roaded and roadless areas. As stated, the Senate
Committee indicated that "judicial review of the RARE II Final [EIS] [... I
is unnecessary."' RARE 11, it will be recalled, was a national review of
roadless areas whose purpose was to include specific lands into the
country's wilderness areas. By declaring the RARE II EIS off-limits to
judicial review, the Committee precluded from review the initial
determinations which went into that survey. These initial decisions
which allowed RARE II to proceed included deciding which lands to
incorporate in the review and which lands to exclude. Lands which the
Forest Service designated "roadless" were included in RARE II's
inventory, while lands determined to be "roaded" were immediately
excluded from the review. As the RARE II final EIS reflects these initial
decisions, it follows that the decisions themselves are also "sufficient" and
beyond review. To hold otherwise would potentially expose RARE II to
review and lead to a "RARE III", contrary to the wishes of Congress.
The Senate Committee intended to include roadless areas within
the category of lands beyond judicial review when it stated that the
"RARE II EIS [is] legally sufficient for the roadless areas [.... 1 3 One
issue which troubled the timber industry, for example, is how soon lands
which have been designated as nonwilderness could again be reviewed
for possible wilderness designation. The Committee responded by stating
that "the release language of section 7 [of the OWAI provides that

89. Id. at 30.
90. Id.
91. National Audubon Society, 4 F.3d at 836 (citing OWA, Pub. L No. 98-328, § 7(b)(3), 98
Stat. at 278).
92. Senate Report on OWA, supra note 45, at 27.
93. Id. at 27.
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wilderness values of these areas need not be reviewed again during
development of the 'first generation plans'." That the Forest Service
could conduct a timber sale in a roadless area and not be challenged on
the basis that the area must be considered for wilderness in a future plan
suggests that Congress intended the initial Forest Service determinations
of roadless or roaded areas to be beyond judicial review. While the
Ninth Circuit correctly holds that the OWA precludes judicial review of
wilderness or nonwilderness designations, it errs when it holds that
RARE II's roaded or roadless determinations can be challenged in a court
of law. What is challengeable by environmental plaintiffs are subsequent
Forest Service developmental decisions, not "first tier", planning
classifications of roaded, roadless, wilderness, or nonwilderness lands.
The Ninth Circuit in National Audubon Society has confused
discrete processes. It has muddled together the "first-tier" process of
designating certain lands "roadless" (for purposes of RARE II) with the
later, "second-tier" process of allocating those roadless, nonwilderness
lands to further development. The OWA allows lands not included in
the National Wilderness Preservation System to be managed for multiple
use. It similarly makes available for future timber harvesting lands
which were inventoried in RARE II and not designated wilderness. The
Senate Committee on the OWA stated that a court could not question the
"legal and factual sufficiency" of the RARE II final EIS.9 That "legal and
factual sufficiency" included determining which lands are roaded and
which lands are roadless.
The Ninth Circuit properly found, notwithstanding its confused
analysis, that further development of nonwilderness lands, either roadless
or roaded, is subject to judicial review. The Forest Service in these
situations clearly is constrained by other statutes, most notably the NEPA,
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)", and the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).Y Consequently, Forest Service decisions to open lands for
harvest may be reviewed by a court of law for potential violations of
relevant state and federal statutes. The four timber sales at issue in
National Audubon Society were properly reviewable by a court of law not
because the lands were roadless or "wilderness-like" but rather because
the OWA may not circumvent other federal statutes like NEPA, MBTA,
and ESA. The fact that the Forest Service decided to prepare an
environmental assessment but not an EIS poses a legal issue properly
challenged in a court of law.

94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 27. On the initial challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the RARE II
Final EIS, see State of California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).

96. Ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-13 (1988)).
97. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C.

§§

1531-44 (1988)).
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There is some ambiguity in National Audubon Society as to the
roadless or roaded character of the four timber sales. The three parties
argued in their briefs to the Ninth Circuit how the lands should be
classified. While the environmental plaintiffs insisted that each tract
contains roadless areas 8 , both the Forest Service and Christie presented
evidence showing the opposite." Regardless of its outcome, this
argument misses the point. The Forest Service has the authority to sell
timber irrespective of whether the lands are roaded or not. It dearly may
not sell timber on wilderness lands. The importance of the character of
lands goes to the need of the Forest Service to prepare an EIS on
activities to be carried out on those lands. Road building, for example,
tends to be ecologically destructive in old growth forests and, for this
reason, roadless lands may in some instances be excluded from timber
harvesting. An area's roadlessness per se, however, should not be
sufficient to preclude timber harvesting. Nevertheless, logging activities
should be denied when the Forest Service has not properly complied with
the statutory mandates of NEPA.' ®
B. Section 318 and JudicialReview
The Forest Service offered the timber sales disputed in National
Audubon Society in fiscal year 1990, pursuant to section 318 of the
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1990. As stated earlier, this act, known as the "Northwest
Timber Compromise", attempted to reconcile competing demands made
on the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) by placing
substantive and procedural restrictions on timber harvesting while
concurrently releasing from litigation over 1 billion board feet of
timber."'1 The Ninth Circuit discussed section 318 alongside the OWA,
since both acts contain judicial review provisions.
Subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Northwest Timber Compromise
prohibits review of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Subsection (b)(3)
expressly bans timber harvesting on forest service lands which are

98. See Plaintiffs-Appellants Opening Brief at 24-27.
99. See Opening Brief for Appellant United States Forest Service at 11-18; Opening Brief
of Defendant-Appellant Bill Christie Jr. and Huffman and Wright Logging Co. at 4.
100. In Smith v. U.S. Forest Service, 33 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit
held that the Forest Service must take a "hardlook" at the environmental repercussions from
logging a 5000 acre roadless area. The Ninth Circuit based its decision on National Audubon
Society, and reaffirmed the principle that the Forest Service may not disregard the mandates
of NEPA.
101. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
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spotted owl habitat. 10 Subsection (b)(5) prevents sales on BLM lands
known to contain spotted owls.'0' Subsection 318(b)(6)(A) then states:
"Without passing on the legal and factual adequacy of the Final [EIS]
[.0. .1,the Congress hereby determines and directs that management of
areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) [ . . is adequate
consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements
[..],1I4 The subsection continues: 'The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review
[ ... 1,iO
The Ninth Circuit had previously interpreted subsection (b)(6)(A)
in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson." In Robertson, the Ninth Circuit
held unconstitutional the subsection as a violation of separation of
powers." The court held that the Congress, in passing section 318, not
only legislated a forest management plan through sections (b)(3) and
(b)(5), but also directed the courts to find that the plan satisfied underlying environmental laws.'" "In doing so", wrote the Ninth Circuit,
"Congress did not amend or repeal laws, as it unquestionably could do,
but rather prescribed a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way, without changing the underlying laws, which it unquestionably
cannot do."' 09
The Supreme Court reversed and held that subsection (b)(6)(A)
of the Northwest Timber Compromise is adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting statutory requirements of the underlying laws such
as NEPA and the MBTA."0 NEPA and MBTA can be satisfied, wrote
Justice Thomas, either through compliance with their respective requirements or through the fulfillment of the requirements of subsections (b)(3)
or (b)(5).'" The Court concluded that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled
changes in law, not findings or results under old law."'
With guidance unavailable to the district court when it decided
National Audubon Society"', the Ninth Circuit analyzed the timber sales

102. The ban on timber harvesting is identified in the final supplement to the EIS for an
amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional Guide-Spotted Owl. See § 318(b)(3), 103 Stat.
at 746.
103. § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746-47.
104. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
105. Id.
106. 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rei'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
107. 914 F.2d at 1317.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
111. Id. at 1413.
112. Id.
113. 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993).
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according to Robertson.114 Compliance with NEPA or MBTA no longer
posed a major problem for the Forest Service, for if the Forest Service
chose not to follow NEPA directly, it could still meet NEPA's mandates
by simply complying with subsection (b)(3)." 5 The Ninth Circuit wrote
that "if the district court determines the timber sales do not violate §§
318(b)(3) & (b)(5), then 'the harvesting without first preparing an EIS
would [.. . be deemed to 'meet' [the requirements of NEPAl regardless
of whether it would cause an otherwise prohibited [major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment]." ' 6 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that, according to Robertson, the Forest Service
could satisfy underlying law by simply complying with section (b)(3) and
avoid timber sales which occur within a "spotted owl habitat area"
(SOHA).117

After the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson, judicial review
under the Northwest Timber Compromise has become, in one sense, a
moot issue. As indicated, the Forest Service may satisfy underlying
NEPA law by either complying directly with NEPA or, importantly, by
complying directly with subsection 318(b)(3). If the Forest Service
chooses the first option and prepares an EA or an EIS (as occurred in
National Audubon Society), then a reviewing court must apply the
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. If the Forest
Service chooses the second option, then it must simply avoid offering
sales which impinge on SOHAs.
The importance of section 318, and the reason why dispute over
judicial review under section 318 may be moot, is that the statute imposes
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review on a court reviewing a
Forest Service action. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson,
the Ninth Circuit had applied the "reasonableness" standard when
reviewing an agency action, a standard which is harder to meet by
agencies." Indeed, the district court in National Audubon Society found

114. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
115. National Audubon Society, 4 F.3d at 839-40 (citing Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413).
116. Id. at 841 (citing Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413).
117. Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L.No.
101-121, § 318((b)(3), 103 Stat. 701, 746 (1990). A "spotted owl habitat area" (SOHA) in the
Rogue River National Forest, as defined by subsection (b)(3), is 1875 acres. For the other
national forests in Washington and Oregon, the sizes of SOHAs range from 1250 to 3200
acres.
118. The Ninth Circuit adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard in Greenpeace
Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992). There the court followed the Supreme
Court lead of Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989), which
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to whether a government agency must
supplement an EIS when it receives additional information. The Ninth Circuit was one of
the last post-Marsh holdouts to follow the reasonableness standard.
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the decision of the Forest Service not to prepare an EIS on each sale to be
"unreasonable', and thus it enjoined the sales." 9 Section 318's imposition of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, however, means
that a timber sale offered pursuant to this statute will likely remain valid
even if environmental groups force judicial review.
The Ninth Circuit has properly adopted the Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 318. In doing so, however, it has applied its
confused reading of the OWA's sufficiency language to section 318's
judicial review provisions. As this comment argues, the OWA's
sufficiency language applies to: (1) the RARE II EIS; (2) RARE II's
wilderness and nonwilderness designations; and (3) RARE II's initial
roaded and roadless determinations. According to the Ninth circuit,
however, if the Forest Service were to follow the requirements of
subsection 318(b)(3) in a fiscal year 1990 timber sale, the district court
need not concern itself with the "roadless" or "roaded" nature of the
land. 2 Presumably, the district court should only make sure that
SOHA's are not adversely affected by the timber sales. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit argues that a lower court could still invalidate a section 318
timber sale on the basis of the land's roaded or roadless nature due to the
OWA. While section 318 does not refer to the roaded or roadless aspects
of timberlands, neither does the OWA allow alternative means to satisfy
NEPA. The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the OWA and section 318
confuses distinct provisions.

CONCLUSION
National Audubon Society v. United States Forest Service & Christie
provides new options to environmental groups who wish to challenge old
growth timber sales. The Ninth Circuit holds that an environmental
group can challenge a timber sale on the basis of the roadlessness of the
land. Even though such a factual challenge goes beyond the intent of the
Senate Committee which oversaw the OWA, the Ninth Circuit's liberal
reading of the OWA and its legislative history clearly favors environmental groups. National Audubon Society illogically separates the determinations which established the scope of the RARE II process from the legal
and factual bases underlying the RARE II EIS. While the final product
is beyond review, the Ninth Circuit says that the decisions which make
up that product are challengeable. Environmental plaintiffs thus possess

119. See Amended Opinion, in E.R., supra note 2, at 152.

120. National Audubon Society, 4 F.3d at 837.
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greater ability to circumvent the OWA's prohibitions on judicial review
after National Audubon Society.12'
The four timber sales in National Audubon Society were offered
pursuant to the Northwest Timber Compromise. This rider to the
appropriations act for the Department of the Interior was similar to others
which preceded it"n and effectively gave the Forest Service great
latitude in fulfilling underlying law like NEPA. It expired on September
30, 1990, so its effects are limited to fiscal year 1990 sales which are
presently being carried out or being litigated in court. Given the
Supreme Court's holding in Robertson, if Congress decides to append
other riders to future appropriations bills, millions of board feet of old
growth timber may be cut despite potentially valid objections by
environmentalists. An attempt to amend the 1991 Interior Appropriations
Bill to override the Endangered Species Act with respect to Pacific
Northwest timber harvests, however, failed at the last moment.l" At
the time of this writing, environmental groups face no substantive
restrictions on bringing suit to enforce the nation's environmental laws.
The Northwest Timber Compromise aside, National Audubon
Society confirms that the OWA is not a "timber cutting statute". The
Forest Service must still follow the requirements of NEPA, ESA, the
MBTA, or other underlying law. Upon remand, the district court in this
case must examine whether the EAs prepared by the Forest Service for
the four timber sales adequately fulfill NEPA's requirements. If not, then
the district court may invalidate the sales. Despite the OWA's restrictive
language, therefore, environmental groups maintain the ability to
challenge Forest Service actions.
The "release-sufficiency" language of the OWA is similar to
provisions found in nearly twenty other wilderness acts. 24 The Ninth
Circuit's decision may have broader implications than simply affecting
four timber sales. If other circuits adopt the Ninth Circuit's dicta
concerning the release-sufficiency language and allow review of timber
sales on the basis of their roadlessness, then environmental groups
throughout the country can influence timber sales on RARE II and
national forest lands. Indeed, there may be impetus to follow the Ninth

121. See Smith v. US. Forest Service, 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. See, e.g., Continuing Appropriations Act for Fscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, §
314,101 Stat. 1329,1329-254 (1987) (reenacted without change in Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314,
102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988), and for fiscal year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat.
701, 743 (1989)).
123. The proposed amendment to H.R. 5769 was Amendment No. 3112, put forth by
Senator Packwood (R-Or). See 136 CONG. REC. S16,771, S16,775-76 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
124. See supra note 44.
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Circuit's lead. Sound management of the country's national forests is an
issue of growing national importance. National Audubon Society deals
with the issue of public participation in forest management decisions and,
albeit in a confused and perhaps ultimately incorrect way, opens a door
to environmental plaintiffs.
John Klein-Robbehaar

